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ABSTRACT 
The public and private interest hypotheses penneate contemporary regulatory analyses. 
Both theories are used to explain the inception of the first major federal regulatory agency, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). According to the public and private interest hypotheses, 
the regulations promulgated by the ICC benefited either railroads or shippers. This paper presents an 
alternative view consistent with the multiple interest theory of regulation. It is demonstrated that the 
major regulatory instrument of the ICC, the shorthaul pricing constraint (SHPC), altered the 
equilibria of railroad markets in a way which benefitted the class of shippers (shorthaul shippers) 
facing monopolistic railroad markets. The SHPC also benefitted some railroads by increasing the 
correspondence between unregulated, cooperative and regulated, noncooperative levels of longhaul 
shipments. The proposition that the ICC benefited shorthaul shippers and railroads is supported by 
an empirical analysis of the effects of the inception of federal regulation and implementation of the 
SHPC on stock prices. The results of the paper indicate that the public and private interest 
interpretations of the ICC are neither contradictory or complete, but instead are complementary. A 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the chief regulatory mechanism of the ICC provides this 
synthesis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many positive theories of regulation posit a solitary motivation for public intervention in 
microeconomic markets. The public interest theory maintains that regulation occurs when markets 
fail (Bator, 1958; Baumol, 1965; and Head, 1962). Political governance of a market enhances 
economic efficiency by increasing consumer welfare. In contrast, the private interest theory holds 
that regulation is a mechanism of monopoly (Stigler, 1971; and Posner, 1974). Political governance 
of a market diminishes economic efficiency by retarding competitive processes and fostering 
producer profits. 
These theories of regulation are deficient on many grounds. Theoretically, a multiple 
interest perspective often seems more appropriate in assessing the positive determinants of 
regulation, particularly when either producer or consumer groups are composed of heterogeneous 
classes of individuals (Peltzman, 1974; and Becker, 1984). This approach is particularly fruitful 
when analyzing modern environmental regulation (Ackerman and Hassler, 1981; Crandall, 1984; 
Elliott, Ackerman, and Millian, 1986; and Pashigian, 1985). Empirically, the evidence seldom 
supports either the pure public or private interest theories but, rather, seems consistent with aspects 
of both (Joskow and Noll, 1981). The positive power of these theories is slight, especially when 
used to try to explain modern economic deregulation (Keller, 1984). And only infrequently are the 
implications of single interest theories consistent with the explicit mechanisms of regulatory control 
(Hilton, 1966). 
Studies of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the first major federal regulatory 
agency, exemplify the inadequacies of single interest theories of regulation. The traditional 
hypothesis holds that the ICC protected shippers from railroad monopolies (Buck, 1920; Benson, 
1955; Bernstein, 1955; Nash, 1957; Miller, 1971; and Hoogenboom and Hoogenboom, 1974). The 
ICC arose to thwart the exercise of market power and, thus, was beneficial to consumers and 
injurious to the commercial interests of railroads. The revisionist hypothesis maintains that the ICC 
sustained railroad monopolies (MacAvoy, 1965; Kolko, 1965; Spann and Erickson, 1970; and 
Alexis, 1982). The ICC promoted the exercise of market power and, thus, was beneficial to railroads 
and detrimental to shipping interests. The chief supporting evidence for the traditional interpretation 
is lower prices in some (shorthaul) markets while the evidence most frequently sighted by revisionist 
proponents is higher prices in other (longhaul) markets. Taken together, this evidence is potentially 
inconsistent with either of the single interest theories. Moreover, analyzes of the political struggles 
surrounding the inception of the ICC indicate that both railroad and shipping interests were 
important considerations in the development of the final legislation (Fiorina, 1984; Gilligan, 
Marshall and Weingast, 1986). The regulations that emerged represented a compromise among 
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distinct groups. Neither of the single interest theories is entirely consistent with the explicit 
regulatory mechanisms contained in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) (Hilton, 1966). 
In a companion paper, the political foundations of a multiple interest group perspective on 
the ICC is developed (Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast, 1986). It is shown that the ICA resulted 
from a coalition of shorthaul shipping and railroad interests. The purpose of this paper is to provide 
the economic foundations for this approach by examining the economic effects of the chief 
regulatory mechanism of the ICC. This mechanism, the shorthaul pricing constraint (SHPC), 
explicitly related the prices that railroads charged in shorthaul and longhaul markets. The effect of 
the SHPC was to decrease shorthaul prices and, provided railroads behaved as other than Bertrand 
competitors in longhaul markets, increase longhaul prices. The SHPC also increased the 
correspondence between unregulated, collusive levels of shipments and regulated, noncooperative 
levels of shipments in longhaul markets. Theoretically, the SHPC unambiguously increased the 
indirect utility of shorthaul shippers and may have increased the profits of railroads operating in both 
longhaul and shorthaul markets. This latter effect holds even if the competitive conjectures held by 
railroads in longhaul markets remain unaltered by the ICA. Thus, the ICA benefitted shorthaul 
shippers and could have been beneficial to railroads, even if no provisions of the ICA facilitated 
cooperation among railroads in otherwise competitive markets. 
The conclusion that shorthaul prices declined as a result of the ICA is widely accepted, even 
among proponents of the revisionist hypothesis. The proposition that the ICA benefitted shorthaul 
shippers is further supported by an empirical analysis, conducted in this paper, of the effects of the 
inception of the ICC on shorthaul shipper security prices. The relationship between the ICA and 
longhaul prices and its interpretation is more controversial (Zerbe, 1980; and Ulen, 1983). A 
fundamental question in assessing theories of early railroad regulation is, however, whether the ICA 
enhanced railroad profitability. The theoretical proposition that railroads benefitted from the 
imposition of the SHPC is supported by an empirical analysis of the effects of the regulation on the 
prices of railroad securities. Indeed, it appears as if the primary beneficiaries were railroads 
insulated from pervasive state regulation influenced by agrarian interests and with extensive 
shorthaul markets who could, thus, rely on the SHPC to increase longhaul prices and profits. The 
empirical evidence is consistent with interpretations drawn from the theoretical section of the paper. 
The empirical analysis does not support the proposition that the ICA enhanced cooperative behavior 
among railroads in competitive markets. 
One implication of this paper is that the single interest theories of regulation, at least as 
applied to the study of early railroad regulation, are incomplete but complementary. The ICA, 
through the SHPC, benefitted some railroads and some shippers. The fundamental deficiency in the 
single interest theories regarding the analysis of early railroad regulation is the assumption of 
homogeneity among producer and consumer groups. Shorthaul and longhaul consumers had very 
little in common. Each faced different railroad market structures. The problems and goals of 
railroads differed greatly depending on their geographical location and the nature and extent of 
railroad markets. A more natural coalition arose between railroads with both long and shorthaul 
markets and shorthaul shippers. The SHPC was a regulatory mechanism which, given the economics 
of the railroad industry at the time, benefitted both shorthaul shippers and railroads. 
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Another, more methodological, implication of this paper is that the mechanisms of 
regulatory control reflect the goals of and compromises among members of the coalition supporting 
the legislation. A major weakness of the multiple interest theory is that it lacks the clear, if 
erroneous, predictions of the single interest theories. By analyzing the explicit mechanisms of 
regulatory control, information can be gained regarding not only the incidence of the regulation, but 
also the economic interests reflected in the ultimate legislation. 
Section II of this paper presents existing theories of early railroad regulation and a summary 
of the important remaining empirical issues. Section III presents a model and analysis of the effects 
of the SHPC on railroad rates, railroad profits and shipper welfare. Section IV contains an empirical 
analysis of the effects of the imposition of federal regulation on the security prices of railroads and 
shorthaul shippers. And finally, Section V is a summary of the conclusions of the paper. 
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
The market structure of the railroad industry in the middle and latter parts of the 19th 
century is essential to interpretations of the origins of the first major federal regulatory agency, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Many marketS were served by only a few or, in many 
instances, one railroad. These so-called shorthaul markets were city-pairs in which at least one end 
point was not a major shipping terminal (e.g., the shipment of freight between isolated communities 
in the upper midwest and the eastern seaboard). Shippers in shorthaul markets faced pervasive 
monopolistic and discriminatory pricing (Friedlaender, p. 11-12). Thus, the ICC may have protected 
shorthaul shippers from railroad monopolies. This interpretation is known as the traditional 
hypothesis (Buck, 1920; Benson, 1955; Bernstein, 1955; Nash, 1957; Miller, 1971; and 
Hoogenboom and Hoogenboom, 1974). The reduction in shorthaul shipping rates following the 
passage of the ICA is frequently held to support the traditional hypothesis. 
Other markets were served by many railroads or alternative modes of transportation. These 
so-called longhaul markets were city-pairs in which both end points were major shipping terminals 
(e.g., the shipment of freight between Chicago and inajor cities on the eastern seaboard). While. 
these longhaul markets contained several potentially competing railroads, nearly all were 
characterized by explicit yet only partially successful cartels (Kolko, 1965; and Ulen, 1980). The 
rates charged in longhaul markets were subject to frequent and wide fluctuations (Ulen, 1983; and 
Porter, 1983). Thus, the ICC could have facilitated longhaul cartels. This interpretation is often 
referred to as the revisionist hypothesis (MacAvoy, 1965; Kolko, 1965; Spann and Erikson, 1970; 
and Alexis, 1982). Increases in the level and stability of longhaul rates subsequent to the passage of 
the ICA are said to support the revisionist hypothesis. 
The revisionist interpretations of the ICA have not gone unchallenged. This so-called post­
revisionist literature has questioned either the statistical validity of the empirical evidence (Zerbe, 
1980) or the theoretical basis underlying the tests (Ulen, 1983). This later category of papers 
primarily argues that the increases in longhaul prices subsequent to the ICA were a by-product of 
general market activity or other provisions of the ICA and unrelated to the effectiveness of the ICA 
in promoting longhaul cartels. The post-revisionist literature, for the most part, provides 
explanations for the empirical regularities of the post-ICA period that are unrelated to the revisionist 
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view of railroad regulation. The factual political and legislative basis of both the traditional and 
revisionist interpretations have also been challenged (Fiorina, 1984; and Skowronek, 1982). 
The post-revisionist literature notwithstanding, several facts about the circumstances 
surrounding the passage of the ICA are known. First, shorthaul shippers, longhaul shippers, and 
railroads were the primary interest groups involved in the construction of the ICA and affected by its 
provisions. Second, prior to the passage of the ICA, shorthaul shipping rates were at or near 
monopoly levels and longhaul shipping rates approximated competitive levels. And third, shorthaul 
shipping rates declined while longhaul shipping rates increased subsequent to the passage of the 
ICA. Figure 1 illustrates these facts. The vertical and horizontal axes represent longhaul and 
shorthaul prices, respectively. The range for both prices is competitive (p1c, Psc) to monopolistic
(p1m, Psm). The preferences of shippers are monotonically declining and lexicographic in their
respective prices. The upper contour sets of the railroad's profit function are convex in prices.1 u;, 
U;'°, and 7t" represent shorthaul shipper indirect utility, longhaul shipper indirect utility, and railroad
profits at the railroad equilibrium prior to the imposition of the SHPC, p • . The points p' and p 11 
represent two possible outcomes under the ICA consistent with the empirical findings in the 
literature. 
Figure 1 also illustrates the primary unresolved issue concerning the economic incidence of
the ICA. Point p 11 represents a regulatory equilibrium consistent with the empirical findings in the
literature which reduces railroad profits, while p' reflects a regulatory change that raises railroad
profits. Can a theoretical analysis of the mechanisms of regulatory control contained in the ICA help 
identify which of these two points were more likely, given the parameters of railroad economics at 
the time? The next section of the paper addresses this question with a theoretical analysis of the 
pricing and profit consequences of the SHPC. And empirically, is there a way to estimate if, in fact, 
the implementation of the regulations contained in the ICA had a positive or negative impact on 
railroad profits? Section IV addresses this question by examining the capital market response to the 
passage and implementation of the ICA. 
Ill. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE SHORTHAUL PRICING CONSTRAINT
The ICA contained several substantive sections addressing different aspects of the regulation 
of the railroad industry of this period. Sections 1-3 of the ICA prescribed that rates be "reasonable 
and just, non-discriminatory and non-preferential." Section 5 prohibited the pooling of traffic or 
revenues by railroads. Section 6 required railroads to publish and reasonably maintain their tariffs 
while sections 7 and 8 provided enforcement regime for the ICA. Each of these provisions either
alone or in conjunction with the others may have affected the equilibria of railroad markets of this 
period. 
Arguably, the most important aspect of the ICA was section 4, the shorthaul pricing
constraint (SHPC ).2 The SHPC made it "unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions 
of the act ... to charge or receive any greater compensation ... for a shorter than for a longer 
distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the long 
distance." Broadly interpreted, the SHPC required that a given railroad charge no more for shorthaul
than for longhaul shipments when certain conditions were met. 
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Two important comparative statics questions arise concerning the SHPC. First, what are the 
effects of the SHPC on prices in the longhaul and shorthaul markets? Is it possible that the 
theoretically predicted consequences of the SHPC regarding railroad rates are consistent with those 
observed subsequent to the adoption of the ICA? While it is obvious that the SHPC required the 
equalization of short and longhaul rates for many railroads, it is not clear whether this requirement 
was met by simply reducing shorthaul prices, raising longhaul prices, or some combination of the 
two. What are the conditions which determined how a given railroad complied with the SHPC? 
Second, what are the effects of the SHPC on railroad profits? Could a regulatory provision so 
explicitly aimed at mitigating local rate discrimination also positively effect railroad profits? And 
how is the impact of the SHPC on railroad profits affected by the exogenous variables of the model? 
This section of the paper conducts an analysis of the effects of the SHPC on railroad rates and 
profits. 
Assumptions and the Model: Several assumptions and simplifications are employed in the 
subsequent analysis. It is assumed that there is one longhaul market containing N ,  i = 1, . . .  , N ,  
railroads producing a homogeneous service. Each railroad operates in one and only one shorthaul 
market, and no shorthaul market is served by more than one railroad. Thus, each railroad is a 
monopolist in its shorthaul market and, at least potentially, a competitor in the longhaul market. The 
variables qu and Qsi represent the quantity of freight hauled by the ith railroad in the longhaul and 
its shorthaul market, respectively. The existing transport technology is represented by 
f; + ci (qu , Qsi ), where f i is a fixed cost incurred by the ith railroad if either qu or Qsi is nonzero and
c; O is the continuous, twice- differentiable and strictly convex variable cost function of the ith 
railroad.3 Inverse demand in the longhaul market is given by p1 (Q1 ), where Q1 = :EieNQu, and in 
the shorthaul markets by Psi (qsi ), and are continuous, twice-differentiable and strictly decreasing in
the total quantity of shipments hauled. 
Define the variable µ; = Psi (qsi) -p1 (Q1 ), which reflects the relationship between longhaul
and shorthaul prices. In the absence of the SHPC, equilibrium shorthaul prices exceed longhaul 
prices. That is, µ; > 0. The effect of a binding SHPC is to constrain µ; to zero. The comparative 
statics of the SHPC are thus given by assessing the effects of deviations ofµ; away from its 
unconstrained levels. 
Unconstrained Equilibria: In the absence of regulatory constraints, the ith railroad maximizes 
(3.1) 1tf = Pl (Q1 )qu +Psi (qsi )qsi -f; - C; (qu ,qsi) 
with respect to Qu, Qsi and µ; subject to the condition thatµ; - Psi (Qsi) + p1 (Q1) = 0. Thus, the
shadow value of the constraint µ; equals zero and equilibria in the long and shorthaul markets have 
familiar representations. Indeed, these equilibria are characterized by the following n + 1 equations
(3.2) P1(Qt) [1+0/ei (Qi*) = :EieNS;MCi(*)
(3.3) Psi (qs:) [1 + lles (qs:)] =MC;(*), i = 1, ... N ,
where e1 (Q/'') and es (qs:) are price elasticities of demand in the longhaul and shorthaul markets,
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respectively, Si = q1:1Qt°, the longhaul market share of the ith railroad, and MCi (*) is marginal
cost. 0 = 'LieNs101 where 01 is the ith railroad's conjecture about the reaction of other railroads in
the longhaul market. 01 is equal to zero, s1 or one as the ith railroad holds Bertrand, Coumot or
collusive conjectures about its competitors behavior. 0 equals zero, the Herfindahl index or unity as
the longhaul market is competitive, Coumot or collusive. Notice that equilibria of the longhaul and 
shorthaul markets are related only through the variable cost function. Indeed, if variable costs are 
separable in short and longhaul shipments, equilibria of the two markets are totally unrelated. 
Panels A and B in Figure 2 illustrate the unconstrained equilibria of the long and shorthaul 
markets, respectively. The curves MMRu and MMRsi are the marginal revenue schedules for the ith
railroad in the long and shorthaul markets given monopoly behavior. The curve PMRu is the
perceived marginal revenue schedule for the ith railroad in the long haul market for 0 < 0; < 1.
Equilibria occur, of course, where the relevant marginal revenue curves intersect the marginal cost 
curves. The prices pt°.Ps: in the figure represent equilibrium prices. Notice that, consistent with the
circumstances prior to regulation, µ;" = Ps: -pt°> 0.
Constrained Equilibria and the Comparative Statics of the SHPC: Under the SHPC, µ1 is no longer
a choice variable but instead an exogenous variable constrained to zero. Thus, given the SHPC, the 
ith railroad maximizes (1) with respect to qu and qsi for a fixed µ1• For any fixed µ1, the necessary
conditions for profit maximization for the ith railroad are given by
(3.4) P1 (Q{)[ l  + (0; lei (Q{))( l + /..,{/q1DJ = MC1 (*)
(3.5) Ps; (qf;)[ l  + ( lles (qf;))( l -/..,f/qf;)] = MC;(*) 
(3.6) µi = Ps1(qf;)-p1(Q{) 
where A.{ is the shadow value of the constraint µ1• From (3.4) - (3.6) it is apparent that/..,{, and thus
the level of µ1 itself, affects the optimal choice of qu and qsi, given by q11 and qi;. The contrast
between the unconstrained and constrained cases is represented by continuous changes in µ1 , the 
fixed positive difference between short and longhaul prices. The comparative statics of interest are 
dqf;ld µ; and dq111dµ1. In the appendix it is shown that dqs11dµ; < 0. dq111dµ1 > 0 if and only if
0; > 0. Thus the SHPC has the effect of reducing shorthaul prices for all values of the exogenous
variables of the model. The SHPC also raises long haul prices whenever railroads are other than 
perfect competitors. 
The intuition behind these comparative statics results is straightforward. In the absence of 
constraints, Psi (qs:) > p1 (Q/') for all i e N ,  as is the case in Figure 2. The SHPC necessitates the
equalization of short and longhaul prices. The SHPC explicitly links the equilibria of the long and 
shorthaul markets by reducing the marginal revenues of longhaul shipments and increasing the 
marginal revenues of shorthaul shipments. Under the SHPC! the marginal revenues of longhaul
shipments has the extra tenn A.(()p1 (Q{)!iJq11 < 0. Increases in qu reduce p1 (Q1) which, under the
SHPC, necessitate decreases in Psi (qsi) which are achieved by increases in qsi. That is, increases in
qu require increases in qsi farther from its monopoly optimum. The curve CMRu in panel A of
Figure 2 represents the marginal revenue schedule for longhaul freight under the SHPC. Similarly, 
under the SHPC, the marginal revenues of shorthaul shipments has the additional tenn 
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-A{dPsi (qfi )12lqfi > 0. Increases in qsi reduce Psi (qsi) which permits reductions in Pt (Qt) and,
therefore, increases in qu. Thus, increases in qsi allow increases in qu closer to the unconstrained,
noncooperative optimum for any ei. The curve CMRsi in panel B of Figure 2 represents the
marginal revenue schedule for shorthaul freight under the SHPC. Notice that CMRu and CMRsi 
intersect their respective marginal cost curves at points where µi = Psi (qi;) -Pt (Q{) = 0.
The price effects of the SHPC are highlighted by the fact that the longhaul price remains 
unchanged when ei = O; when railroads in the longhaul market are Bertrand competitors. When
ei = 0 for all i e N ,  no railroad expects to affect longhaul price by altering its level of shipments.
That is, dPt (Q{)l2lqt1 = 0 and the marginal revenue schedule in the longhaul market is not altered by
the SHPC. All of the adjustment to the SHPC must, therefore, take place in the shorthaul market.
Railroad Profits and the SHPC: It is also apparent from (3.4) - (3.6) and the comparative statics
results that the SHPC affects the profits of railroads. To examine this question, let 
. 1t{ (q/1 (µi ), qfi (µi ), µi)  represent the maximum profits of the ith railroad for every value of µi. 
Applying the envelope theorem, 
where dQf-ildµi = r,ieNdqt1fdµi for all but the ith railroad and represents the change in the total
shipment of longhaul freight resulting from an increase in µi. The second term in (3.7), /.,,{, is the
direct effect of the SHPC on railroad profits. Since the SHPC constrains railroads from their optimal 
choice of qu, qsi, this term is positive whenever the SHPC is binding and zero otherwise. A
reduction in µi away from the unconstrained optimum marginally reduces railroad profits. The first
term in (3.7) is the indirect effect of the SHPC. Since the SHPC causes all railroads to reduce 
longhaul shipments when 0i > 0, this term is negative. For 0 > 0, the SHPC moves the longhaul
level of freight shipments closer to the unconstrained, monopoly optimum therefore contributing to 
railroad profits. 
Whether the direct or indirect effects of the SHPC dominate depend on the exogenous 
variables of the model. For instance, the marginal increase in railroad profits resulting from the 
imposition of the SHPC is larger the more elastic is longhaul demand and the more inelastic is 
shorthaul demand.4 Elastic longhaul demand increases the magnitude of the indirect effect by
reducing the absolute value of the denominator and increasing the size of the numerator. The later 
effect results since elastic longhaul demand necessitates larger reductions in qu to meet the SHPC
and, thus, more of a correspondence between the constrained optimal level of longhaul freight and 
the unconstrained monopoly level of longhaul shipments. On the other hand, inelastic shorthaul 
demand increases the costs of adjusting to the SHPC in shorthaul markets. Inelastic shorthaul 
demand increases the longhaul adjustments necessary to comply with the SHPC and, again, creates 
more of a correspondence between the constrained optimal level of longhaul freight and the 
unconstrained monopoly level of longhaul shipments. The net effect of the SHPC on railroad profits 
remains, however, a matter for empirical investigation. 
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IV. SOME EVIDENCE ON THE ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF THE ICA
The empirical debate over the validity of the traditional and revisionist interpretations of the 
ICA have focused almost exclusively on post-ICA longhaul and shorthaul prices. There is little 
doubt that shorthaul prices in the period immediately following the passage and implementation of 
. the ICA were lower. Similarly, longhaul prices appeared to rise, albeit moderately, in the post-ICA 
environment. This evidence is necessary but not sufficient for the interpretation of the SHPC 
presented above. There are alternative explanations for the rise in longhaul prices subsequent to the 
passage of the ICA. Long haul prices could have risen due to the level and stability of the demand 
for railroad services in the post-ICA period. Such circumstances may have increased the 
effectiveness of the private mechanisms of railroad cartel enforcement (Ulen, 1983). These critiques 
indicate that movements in longhaul prices subsequent to the ICA may have little bearing on the 
beneficial aspects of the ICA for railroads or the interpretations derived above. Moreover, shorthaul 
and longhaul price data, in general, are insufficient to determine the profits consequences of the ICA 
for railroads. An alternative empirical technique is required.
Regulation and Asset Prices: Consider an asset that represents a claim on a percentage of the future
profits of a firm. Let P;1 be the discounted value of all future cash flows to the asset at time t. Then
where .n = [l,oo), 1t;i+k is the cash flow to the asset in period t + k, s; is the percentage claim to the
cash flow of the ith asset, and r; is the discount rate representing the opportunity costs of the cash
flow given its riskiness (assumed constant over time). 
Suppose that the time series of expected cash flows is changed by regulation. The 
contemporaneous price of the asset changes by the capitalized value of the changes in the expected 
future cash flows according to 
(4.2) P; -PiJ = �iens;(1t;;+k-1tit+k)/(l + r;)
where P;; and 1t1; + k are the equilibrium price and expected cash flows in the new regulatory
environment. The effects of regulation on the future profitability of a firm are magnified and 
captured in the contemporaneous change in asset prices. Regulations that cause large (small) and 
immediate (distant) changes in the expected profits of a firm result in large (small) changes in the 
current price of the asset. These effects are also reflected in any time series based on the asset's
price, such as the percentage return to the asset. 
A Model of Railroad Stock Returns: Abnormal changes in the returns to certain assets can be used to
assess the expected effects of the ICA and the SHPC. Assumptions about the workings of capital 
markets and the formation of equilibrium asset prices must be specified to determine precisely what 
is meant by "abnormal" and thus to conduct such tests. The first assumption is that the efficient 
markets/rational expectations hypothesis holds. This hypothesis states that asset prices reflect all
available relevant information. An implication of the hypothesis is that it is impossible to make 
profits by trading stocks on the basis· of available information. That is, if Rit is the return on the ith 
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asset or portfolio of assets in period t, <I>1_1 is the information available in period t - 1, and E(*) is the
expectation operator, then E (ei1) = 0 where eit = Rii - E (Rit I <I>1_i ). Essentially, this hypothesis
implies that the effects of new information are reflected fully and quickly in asset prices. The 
empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is substantial (Schwert, 1981). 
A second assumption concerns the process by which equilibrium asset returns are generated. 
A multiple factor model is used to represent the process generating asset return risk premia.5
Accordingly, 
(4.3) Ri1 - Rft = Ei = Ljej BijXj1 + eit 
where Rit is the return to the ith asset in period t, Rft is the return to a risk-free asset in period t, Xj1 
is the value of the jth systematic factor commonly influencing all asset's returns in period t, Ei is the 
expected return premium for the ith asset, Bij are parameters, and ei1 is the idiosyncratic noise term
associated with asset i in period t. The idiosyncratic term is assumed independent across assets, 
independent of the factors and has a mean of zero. 
(4.3) provides a basis for measuring "abnormal" returns to assets. Abnormal returns are the 
measured parts of Ri, - R ft unaccounted for by relation ( 4.3). Given the efficient markets/rational
expectations hypothesis, abnormal returns result from changes in information relevant for 
determining the expected future profits or cash flows underlying Rit -Rft. 
Regulatory Events: Two events are taken to reflect the regulatory impact on the stock returns of 
relevant assets analyzed below. The first event is the Supreme Court's decision in Wabash, St. Louis 
& Pacific v. Illinois in late October of 1886. This decision struck down existing state regulation
affecting interstate commerce thus changing the opportunities for federal regulation. Indeed, 
Wabash ended the decade long legislative stalemate between the House of Representatives
(dominated by shorthaul shipping interests) and the Senate (dominated by railroads). A compromise 
bill was fashioned in Congress within six weeks of the Wabash decision. The Supreme Court's
decision in Wabash changed the prevailing expectations regarding the likelihood of federal
regulation of railroads.6 
The second event encompasses the establishment of the ICC and its preliminary 
interpretations of the SHPC. As many scholars of the early years of ICC regulation point out, the 
statutory language creating the SHPC was somewhat ambiguous and subject to interpretation. 7
Indeed, there is little doubt that the eventual interpretation given Section 4 by the Supreme Court 
was at variance with that intended by it Congressional sponsors. 8 However, the degradation of the
SHPC by the courts did not occur until the midpoint of the last decade of the nineteenth century. 9
Early interpretations and enforcement attempts by the ICC indicated an intention to construe this 
section strictly and apply it rigidly.10 These events should move the expected outcome under
federal regulation towards that of the theoretical model presented above. 
Data and Specification: Equation ( 4.4) is estimated for the six portfolios identified in Table 1 using
monthly data for the five year period 1884-1888. One of these portfolios contains the assets of one 
of the major shorthaul shippers of the period, coal mining companies, while the remaining five 
portfolios contain the securities of railroads from different geographical regions of the country. This 
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geographical diversity is exploited further below. 
(4.4) PORT11 -MONEY, = et.1 +Pu MARKET, + P2i FINANCE, + l33i OUTPUT, 
+ P4i PRICES +Yu WABASH +Y2i SHPC+ei1 
where PORTi1 = the return to the ith index or portfolio of assets in month t;
MONEY1 =the commercial paper rate in New York City on choice 60-90 day two
name paper for month t; 
MARKET, = the return risk premium on an index of common industrial stocks in
month t; 
FINANCE, =the percentage change in total monthly bank clearings outside of New
York in month t, in thousands of dollars;
OUTPUT, =the percentage change in an index of U.S. pig iron production for month
t; 
PRICES, = the percentage change in a price index for the U.S. in month t; 
W ABASH1 = an indicator variable equally 1 for the months of October and November,
1886 and 0 otheiwise; 
SHPC1 = an indicator variable equally 1 for the months of April and May, 1887
and 0 otherwise; 11
a1 ,p ji , 'tki = estimated parameters of the model; and
ei1 = a serially uncorrelated random error term.
The Pji of the model represent the factor loadings of the systematic variables on the ith 
portfolio. Since MARKET, is an approximation to the return risk premium on the market portfolio,
Pii > 0. The remaining systematic variables are theoretically correlated with the general level of
economic and financial activity. The variables FINANCE,, OUTPUT, and PRICES1 are measures of
real and nominal economic activity. Thus, �2i, �3i and �4i should all correlate with the portfolio 
returns. Table 2 describes the variables used in the estimation of (4.4) and identifies their sources. 
Table 3 presents some summary statistics of these variables.
Estimation Results: Equation (4.4) is estimated for each of the six monthly return series described
above. These equations are estimated jointly using Zellner's Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Technique to allow for contemporaneously correlated error terms across equations.12 Table 4
presents the estimation results. 
To begin, most of the systematic variables help explain the variation in the returns to the 
individual portfolios. The variable MARKET is significant in each equation at greater than the .01 
percent level and the coefficients are, as expected, all positive. The hypothesis that the coefficients 
on MARKET across all six equations jointly equal zero can also be rejected with a high degree of 
confidence, as reflected by the likelihood ratio test statistic reported in the last column of Table 4. 
Several of the other systematic variables are also significant in the individual equations. The 
variable OUTPUT, when significant, is positively correlated with the portfolio returns. The portfolio 
returns are also sensitive to changes in the price level, as reflected by the variable PRICES. The 
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hypothesis that all six coefficients jointly equal zero (Hl )  13 can be rejected at at least the .10 percent
level for PRICES and OUTPUT. 
The variables WABASH and SHPC also help explain the variation in the returns to the 
individual portfolios. Many of the coefficients on WABASH and SHPC individually are 
significantly different from zero. For instance, WABASH increased values by 9 .1 % (standard error, 
4.7) on the COAL, by 10.0% (3.1) on the SOUTH, and 3.3% (3.1) on the JEC portfolios. SHPC 
increased values by 7.7% (3.1) on the JEC and by 3.4% (2.6) on the WEST portfolios. All of the
coefficients on the regulatory response variables are positive. Moreover, the the hypothesis that the 
sum of the coefficients on the WABASH and SHPC variables equals zero (H2) 14 can rejected at at
least the .10 percent level for the COAL, JEC, and SOUTH portfolios. Jointly, WABASH and 
SHPC increased values by 15.8% on the COAL, 11.0% on the JEC, 2.3% on the IOWA, 13.1 % on 
the SOUTH, 4.6% on the WEST, and 4.1 % on the SHORT portfolios. The hypothesis that all of the 
coefficients on the regulatory event variables equal zero is rejectable at the .01 % level for WABASH 
and at the .15 % level for SHPC. 15
The results of the analysis confirm that the imposition of federal regulation of railroads 
through the ICA benefitted shorthaul shippers. Shorthaul price declines were anticipated and 
reflected in the expected return of a portfolio of shorthaul shippers' assets. The empirical results 
further indicate that despite the reduction in shorthaul prices and the beneficial effect of the ICA on 
shorthaul shippers, federal regulation also benefitted railroads. The abnormal returns for all of the 
railroad portfolios is positive and, in the majority of cases, significantly different from zero. These 
results augment the debate about the behavior of longhaul prices subsequent to the ICA. These 
results also support the chief hypothesis of this paper that shipping and railroad interests were not 
necessarily contradictory under federal regulation. The ICA benefitted both (shorthaul) shippers and 
railroads. 
Heterogeniety in Return Responses: Further support for the hypothesis of this paper along with 
identification of the characteristics of railroads benefitted by the ICA are gained by modelling the 
estimated return responses of railroads to WABASH and SHPC. According to the theoretical model 
presented above, the ability of the SHPC to enhance railroad profits depended on the existence of 
monopolistic shorthaul markets. The equalization of prices under the SHPC caused longhaul price 
increases and movements towards the longhaul monopoly optimum. The rate of return on physical 
railroad capital, ROI, is used to measure the existence and extent of monopolistic shorthaul markets 
contained in the territory served by the railroads in a given portfolio.16 The higher the rate of return
of railroads in a given portfolio, the larger the expected abnormal return. 
The relationship between the estimated regulatory response and ROI given by the model 
developed above is in stark contrast to the revisionist interpretation. According to the revisionist 
hypothesis, the ICA benefitted railroads by facilitating collusion in otherwise competitive markets. 
Railroads in competitive markets and earning a lower return on capital than those railroads in 
monopolistic markets should, therefore, have experienced a larger regulatory response. Examining 
the relationship between the observed regulatory responses and ROI provides a direct test of the 
revisionist interpretation versus the interpretation given above. 
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An additional test of the revisionist hypothesis is possible given the recognition that the 
success of private cartels prior to the ICA varied across railroads in our various portfolios. For 
instance, railroads in the SOUTH portfolio were reported to have the most successful cartel of the 
period, 17 while those in the JEC, IOWA and WEST suffered frequent bouts of competitive
behavior. 18 Railroads in the SHORT portfolio served mostly shorthaul markets and were less
dependent on successful private cartels for their profitability. The dummy varible NET, equal to 
unity for JEC, IOWA and WEST and zero otherwise, identifies those railroad portfolios likely to 
differentially benefit from the ICA if its purpose was to foster and stabilize private cartels. If the 
revisionist hypothesis holds, NET should be positively correlated with the estimated share price 
responses of the railroad portfolios. 
The regulatory response may vary for reasons other than those posited by the models 
presented above. For instance, the intrusiveness of state regulation on railroad behavior varied 
greatly across the six portfolios. While all states had state railroad commissions, the goals and 
resources of these commissions were not homogeneous. The actual consequences of these 
commissions often depended on the salient political interests in the state. Elsewhere we show that 
the value of farmland is a good proxy for farming (shorthaul shipping) influence in the state 
regulatory processes.19 It is expected that the beneficial effects of federal regulation for railroads is
offset by the influence of shipping interests in state regulatory commissions subsequent to the ICA. 
The per capita value of farmland in the territory served by the railroads in a given portfolio, LAND, 
is used to measure farming influence in state regulatory process and, thus, should reduce the 
observed regulatory response. 
Consequently, the response parameters are modelled as 
where LAND; =the per capita value of farm land in the territories served by railroads in
the ith portfolio; 
ROI; =the average return on railroad capital in the territories served by railroads 
in the ith portfolio; and 
NET; = a dummy variable equally 1 for JEC, IOWA and WEST and 0 otherwise.
Equation (4.4) is re-estimated for the five railroad portfolios with (4.5) substituted for 'Yji . Moreover, 
while the parameters on the characteristics can be uniquely estimated for each of the regulatory 
events, here they are restricted to equality.20 This restriction cannot be rejected at the .10 percent
level. Each event is allowed to have a unique constant, however. 
The results of the estimation are present in Table 5. The first two parameters are estimates 
of the mean regulatory responses to WABASH and SHPC, respectively. The next three parameters 
illustrate the relationship between the regulatory responses and the heterogeneous characteristics of 
the portfolios. As predicted by the model presented above, ROI increases the value of the regulatory 
responses at a statistically significant level. A small increase in ROI at the mean rate of return 
increases the regulatory response by 14.31 %. The impact of per capita land values on the regulatory
responses is negative as expected and statistically significant. A small increase in the per capital 
value of farm land decreases the regulatory response by 6.11 %. And finally, the relationship 
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between the regulatory response and the characteristics of railroad cartels is  negative and 
insignificant. The hypothesis that all of the characteristics are irrelevant for explaining the 
heterogeneous share price responses (H3) can be rejected with a high level of certainty, as indicated 
in the table. 
The results of the regulatory response estimation support the theoretical model derived 
above. Railroads participating in monopolistic markets derived substantially higher benefits from 
the imposition of federal regulation. Railroads in regions of strong farm influence in local regulatory 
processes gained less from the adoption of federal regulation. The success of private railroad cartels 
had little bearing on the observed share price response. The evidence contradicts the revisionist 
hypothesis that the ICA benefitted railroads by facilitating collusion in competitive markets and 
supports the interpretation derived above. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides the economic foundations of a multiple interest perspective for the 
motivations and effects of the first major federal regulatory agency, the ICC. The theoretical 
implications of the chief regulatory mechanism of the ICC, the SHPC, were examined. It was shown 
that the SHPC decreased shorthaul prices and, providing that railroads were other than Bertrand 
competitors, increased longhaul prices. These results comport with the empirical findings of the 
effects of the ICA on railroad rates reported elsewhere. It was also shown that the SHPC may have 
. caused an increase in the total profits of railroads operating in both short and longhaul markets. The 
SHPC creates two effects. First, the SHPC causes increases in the total shipments of shorthaul 
freight beyond the monopoly optimum. This effect reduces railroad profits. Second, the SHPC 
causes decreases in the total shipments of longhaul freight toward the monopoly optimum. This 
effect increases railroad profits. If the longhaul effect dominates the shorthaul effect, railroad profits 
increase. The longhaul effect is more likely to dominate the more (in)elastic is demand in the 
(shorthaul) longhaul market. The ability of the SHPC to affect railroad profitability assumes 
constant competitive conjectures by railroads. The ICA did not have to promote collusion among 
railroads to enhance railroad profits. 
The empirical analyses support the arguments developed in the theoretical section of the 
paper. The share price data indicate that changing expectations about the possibility of federal 
regulation and the application of the SHPC increased the future expected profits of a major class of 
shorthaul shippers (coal mines) and all types of railroads. The average regulatory response for all
portfolios was 7.97% while the average regulatory response for the railroad portfolios was 6.12%. 
Based on a crude calculation, the implied present value increase in railroad profits totalled $461.3
million nationally.21 Moreover, the regulatory response was greater for those railroads operating in
monopolistic markets, a result implied by the analysis of the SHPC presented above but one 
inconsistent with the revisionist interpretation. The presence of strong agrarian influence reduced 
the regulatory response for railroads as well as non-agrarian, shorthaul shippers. The relative 
success of private railroad cartels had little bearing on the estimated effects of the ICA. 
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These results are incongruous with the single interest interpretations of the ICC and suggest 
that a multiple interest perspective is more appropriate. More generally, the analysis conducted in 
this paper identifies situations where the single and multiple interest approaches are applicable. 
Where producers and consumers constitute relatively homogeneous groups and markets are similarly 
characterized, the single interest perspective is appropriate. In these situations, the inexorable
tension between producers and consumers exists and regulations which alter economic equilibria can 
benefit one group only at the expense of the other. Where producers or consumers are heterogeneous 
or the characteristics of markets are disparate, the multiple interest perspective should be utilized. In 
such situations, regulation can alter equilibria in complicated and subtle ways conferring benefits and 
harm on limited classes of consumers and/or producers. This conclusion suggests that detailed 
analysis of the explicit mechanisms of regulatory control and their incidence on different types of 
producers and consumers can be helpful in understanding the motivations and effects of regulation. 
This conclusion also suggests that understanding the political institutions that generate regulatory 
mechanisms and the role that various producer and consumer types play in them can also contribute 
to our understanding of regulation. This latter conclusion is drawn out in a companion paper. 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix presents the comparative statics exercise summarized above. Let f 1, f 2, and f 3 
represent the three first-order necessary conditions presented in (3) above and H the border Hessian 
of second-order sufficient conditions. Sufficiency requires 
f 11f12! 13 
(A.1) IHI = /21/ 22/23 > 0
f 31 f 32/ 33 
where f 11 =Pi {[1 +(0i /e1 (Q/'))(l+'A/'lq17)J-'A/'lq17}-dMCJaqu 
f 12=0 
! 13 =Pi 
f 21=0 
f 22 = a.i (1 +(lies (qsi))(l-'At1q;)+a.i 'AtlqsiJ-dMCi!aqsi 
f 23 =-a.i 
f 31 =Pi 
f 32 =-<Xi 
f 33 =0 
Pi =Pt (Qt)0Je1 (Q[")q17 
( *)/ ( *) • <Xi =Psi qsi Es qsi qsi
The comparative statics of interest are dq171dµi and dqsildµi. That is, how do the optimal quantities
of freight shipments by the ith railroad in the long and shorthaul markets change as the positive 
difference between short and longhaul prices increases. Total differentiation of system (3) yields the 
system of linear equations 
[�J 
Solving for dq171 d µi and dqs�ld µi by Cramer's rule,
dq171dµi = -f 2zf 13/ IHI > 0
(A. 3) 
Notice that f 13 and, thus, dq171d µi are equal to zero when 0; equals zero. The level of freight
carried by the ith railroad in the longhaul market is unaffected by fixed differences in short and 
longhaul price if and only if railroads are Bertrand competitors in the longhaul market. 
* 
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1. Let (p , y )  and (p' , y' ) be two profit-maximizing price-output combinations and let
p "  = 'tp + (1 - 't)p ' for any 0 s; 't s; 1. It is clear that 1t(p" , y" ) = p"y" = 
'tpy" + (1 - 't)p 'y" . Since y" is not necessarily the profit-maximizing level of output for 
either p or p ', py" s; 1t(p , w) and p 'y" s; 7t(p ', w ). Thus, 7t(p" ,  w) s; 't7t(p , w) +
(1 - 't)7t(p '
, w ).
2. Hadley (1887) summarizes the ICA as follows.
The Interstate Commerce Act, as finally passed, contained four sets of provisions: 1. 
A reaffirmation of the common-law doctrine of equality of treatment, with certain 
special provisions as to publicity and stability of rates, which should aid in securing 
such equality; 2. The prohibition of a greater aggregate charge to or from an 
intermediate point than for the whole through route-the so-called Short Haul 
Oause; 3. The prohibition of pools; 4. The establishment of a Commission to aid in 
enforcing the law, but with power to suspend the execution of the Short Haul Clause 
in certain cases. (p. 162) 
He continues by recognizing that the shorthaul clause attracted the most attention of all of the 
provisions of the Act. Indeed, in the early months of the Commission, temporary suspensions 
of the shorthaul clause were requested and issued (First Annual Report of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission). However, none of these variances were continued. Moreover, early 
interpretations of the SHPC by the Commission narrowed the range of possible exceptions to 
the SHPC (in re Louisville and Nashville, 1 Interstate Commerce Reports, 31, and Vermont 
State Grange v. Boston and Lowell, 1 Interstate Commerce Reports, 158). The Commission 
boasted some years later that flagrant instances of local discrimination had been eliminated 
except in certain parts of the Southeastern part of the country (Eleventh Annual Report of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, p. 41).
3. This assumption is consistent with the cost analysis conducted in Spann and Erickson (1970).
4. Indeed, the total demand facing railroads in longhaul markets was probably more elastic than
shorthaul demand. Railroads often faced competition from alternative modes of transportation,
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such as barge or riverboats. The storage facilities available shippers were more prevalent at 
longhaul origination points, thus giving shippers some flexibility pertaining to the timing of 
their shipments. 
5.  The linearity of the portfolio return premia in these systematic factors follows from an Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (Ross, 1976; Roll and Ross 1980) or a Multi-Beta Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(Sharpe, 1977; Rosenberg and Guy, 1976; and Ross, 1976). 
6. To quote Fiorina (1984) on the surprise, "During the recess (for the 1886 congressional
elections) the Supreme Court dropped a bombshell with its Wabash decision. Furthermore,
given the earlier debates and events there is good reason to believe that absent the Wabash
stimulus, the House and Senate would have remained at loggerheads, continuing the decade­
long debate into future congresses." This judgement is supported by contemporary observers.
In the New York Times, for example, two day following Wabash, an article urged national
legislation stating that Wabash was the strongest kind of argument in favor of long-delayed
national legislation. By December 10th, the Times reported that there was little doubt that the 
bill would become law, and (two days latter) that Wabash was believed to have pushed forward
the legislation. This surprise view is widely held. See Hilton (1966), Haney (1908), Cushman
(1941), and Schwartz (1973).
7. Literal application of the SHPC was impossible absent the interpretations given it by the
Commission and, eventually, the courts. Phrases such as "like kind of property," "under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions," "same line," "special cases," and
"investigation" rendered application of the SHPC, at least conceptually, problematic. See
Hilton ( 1966) for a discussion of these points.
8. The courts eventually "emasculated" the SHPC by its interpretations of what constituted a "same 
line" (Osborne v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co. ,  52 Fed. Rep. 912, 1891, and 48 Fed. Rep.
49, 1892) and what constituted "substantially similar circumstances and conditions" (/.C.C. v. 
Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. , 57 Fed. Rep. 187, 1896, and /.C. C. v. Alabama Midland R.R. Co.,
168 U.S. 144, 1897). Indeed, the Supreme Court found in the Alabama Midland decision that
differences in competitive circumstance (the existence of water carriers) created sufficient
dissimilarities to suspend applications of the SHPC.
9. Dewey (1935) identifies four distinct periods in the history of the SHPC in federal rate
regulation. These periods are (1) the beginning of effective control, 1887-1897, (2) the
principle emasculated, 1897-1910, (3) the revival of effective control, 1910-1920, and (4)
extensions of effective control, 1920-present (1935). The "emasculation" of the SHPC was
conducted by the courts in cases identified above.
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1 0. The earliest interpretation of the SHPC by the Commission established its position on this 
important regulatory issues for years to come (In Re Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. , 1 ,  
I.C.C., 3 1, 1 887). The commission began hearings on the applicability of the SHPC in this 
cases in April of 1 887 and rendered its decision on June 15th, 1887. Generally speaking, the 
commission 's decision established a rigid interpretation of the SHPC and acknowledged few 
exceptions. The discussion in Dewey ( 1935, p. 65-74) is an excellent summary of the issues 
involved with enforcement of the SHPC. 
1 1 . The use of these two, two month event windows is motivated by the nature and timing of the 
regulatory events (see footnotes #6 and #10). The qualitative results of the analysis remain 
unaltered when additional months are added to either side of these two month windows. The 
precision of the results, of course, suffer (Brown and Warner, 1 980). 
1 2. See Binder ( 1 985) for a discussion of this technique. 
1 3. Under the null hypothesis, the likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed as x2(6). The critical 
value for X2(6, . 10) is 1 0.62. 
14. Under the null hypothesis, the likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed as x2(6). The critical 
value for X2(1 ,  . 1 0) is 2.72. 
15. The likelihood ratio test statistic is 1 9.53. which is distributed as x2(1 2) under the null 
hypothesis. 
16. The territorial groups are taken from The Fifth Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and correspond rather well with the actual localities served by railroads in the
various portfolios. The ROI variable equals the ratio of gross revenues to capital investment
(the sum of the value at costs of railroad property, plant, and equipment). These data are taken
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States for that year.
17. See D. T. Gilchrist ( 1960). Indeed, many of the practices and mechanisms used by the Southern
Railway and Steamship Association to foster their cartel were used to exemplify the "ideal"
railroad position in attempts to gain federal legislation.
18. See Porter ( 1983) for an empirical investigation of the cartel (in)stability of the JEC. M. Klein
( 1984, p. 1 37-175) has a good description of the instability that characterized western railroads.
1 9. These variables are used in estimations of key votes on the ICA in the House of 
Representatives. The relationships between these variables and voting behavior is as expected 
(for instance, representatives from states with higher valued farm land tend to vote for 
provisions benefitting farming interests) and statistically significant in several alternative 
specifications (Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast, 1 986). 
1 9  
20. The likelihood ratio statistic to test the hypothesis of homogeneous coefficients across 
regulatory responses is 4.457, which is distributed as x2(3) under the null hypothesis of the
unrestricted model. The critical value for X2(3, . 10) is 6.25.
21 .  Recall that ROI = GR/CAP where G R  i s  gross revenues and CAP total railroad capital. Then 
dROI = (l/CAP)/dGR. The dGR figure implied by dROI is the reported in the text. Notice that
since the capital market analysis reflects only adjusts to claims available to equity holders, this 
figure represents a lower bound. 
20 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ackerman, B ., and W. Hassler. 1981. Clean Coal/Dirty Air. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Alexis, M. 1982. "The Applied Theory of Regulation: Political Economy of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission." Meltzer, A., Ordeshook, P. and T. Romer, eds. Carnegie Papers on 
Political Economy. Public Choice 39:5-28. 
Beale, J. and B. Wyman. 1906. Railroad Rate Regulation with Special Reference to American 
Legislation. Boston: W.J. Nagel. 
Benson, L. 1955. Merchant, Farmers, Railroads. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Binder, J. 1985. "Measuring the Effect of Regulation with Stock Price Data." Rand Journal of 
Economics 16:167-183. 
Brown, S. and J. Warner. 1980. "Measuring Security Price Perfonnance." Journal of Financial 
Economics 8:205-258. 
Buck, S. 1920. The Agrarian Crusade. Toronto: Glasgow, Brook and Co. 
Cowles, A. 1939. Common Stock Indexes. Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, 
Monograph No. 3. Bloomington: Principia Press. 
Crandall, R. 1983. "Air Pollution, Environmentalists and the Coal Lobby," in Noll, R. and B. 
Owen. Political Economy of Deregulation Washington DC: AEI. 
Cushman, R. 1941. The Independent Regulatory Commissions. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Dewey, R. 1935. The Long and Short Haul Principle of Rate Regulation. Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press. 
Elliot, E., Ackennan, B. and J. Millian. "Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The 
Federalization of Environmental Law." Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
1:313:40. 
Fiorina, M. 1984. "The Effects of Uncertainty on the Delegation of Legislative Power." Working 
Paper. Harvard University. 
2 1  
Fogel, R. 1964. Railroads and American Economic Growth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Friedlaender, A. 1969. The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regulation. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution. 
Gilchrist, D. T. 1960. "Albert Fink and the Pooling System. Business History Review 34:25-49. 
Gilligan, T., Marshall, W. and B. Weingast. 1986. "Regulation and the Theory of Legislative 
Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887." Working Paper. Caltech. 
Haney, L. 1908. A Congressional History of Railways. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Hilton, G. 1 966. "The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act." Journal of Law and 
Economics 9:87- 1 13. 
Hoogenboom, A. and 0. Hoogenboom. 1974. A History of the Interstate Commerce Act. New 
York: Norton. 
Klein, M. 1984. The Life and Legend of Jay Gould. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Kolko, G. 1965. Railroads and Regulation: 1877-1918. New York: Norton. 
Macauly, F. 1938. Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Movements of Interest Rates, Bond 
Yields, and Stock Prices in the United States Since 1856. New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
MacAvoy, P. 1965. The Economic Effects of Regulation: The Trunk Line Railroad Cartels and the 
Interstate Commerce Commission before 1900. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Noyes, W. 1905. American Railroad Rates. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 
Pashigian, P. 1985. "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?" 
Mimeo. University of Chicago. 
Peltzman, S. 197 6. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of Law and 
Economics 19 :21 1 -40. 
Porter, R. 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-86." Bell 
Journal of Economics 14:301-14. 
22 
Roll, R. and S. Ross. 1980. "An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory."  Journal
of Finance 35: 1073-1104. 
Rosenberg, B. and J .  Guy. 1976. "Prediction of Beta from Investment Fundamentals." Financial 
Analysts Journal 32:60-72. 
Ross, S. 1976. "The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing." Journal of Economic Theory 
13:341-360. 
Schwartz, B. 1973. The Economic Regulation of Business and Industry. Volume 1. New York: 
Chelsea House. 
Sharpe, W. 1977. "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: A Multi-Beta Interpretation. "  In H. Levy and 
M. Samat (eds.), Financial Decision Making Under Uncertainty. New York: Academic Press. 
Skowronek, S. 1982. Building a New American States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Spann, R. and E. Erickson. 1970. "The Economics of Railroading: The Beginning of Cartelization 
and Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics 1:227-44. 
Stigler, G. 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics 2:3-21. 
Ulen, T. 1982. "Railroad Cartels Before 1887: The Effectiveness of Private Enforcement of 
Collusion." Research in Economic History 8 :125-44. 
Zerbe, R. 1980. "The Costs and Benefits of Early Regulation of the Railroads." Bell Journal of 
Economics 11 :343-50. 
Portfolio/Composition 
Coal Mining 
Joint Executive Committee 
Canadian Southern 
Lake Shore 
Michigan Central 
New York Central 
New York Central & Hudson River 
New York, Chicago & St. Louis 
New York, Lake Erie & Western 
Iowa Pool 
Chicago & Northwestern 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis 
& Omaha 
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific 
Missouri Pacific 
Southern Railroads 
Chesapeake & Ohio 
Louisville & Nashville 
East Tennessee, Virginia 
& Georgia 
Mobile & Ohio 
Memphis & Charleston 
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis 
Norfolk & Western 
Western Railroads 
Union Pacific 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Central Pacific· 
Northern Pacific 
Shorthaul Railroads 
Cleveland, Columbus, 
Cincinnati & Indiana 
TABLE 1 
STOCK PORTFOLIOS 
Notation 
COAL 
JEC 
IOWA 
SOUTH 
WEST 
SHORT 
Columbus, Hocking Valley & Toledo 
Evansville & Terre Haute 
Indiana, Bloomington & Western 
1 Fifth Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
ICC Territorial 
G . 1 roupmg 
II 
II & III 
VI 
IV & V
VII & VIII 
III 
Variable 
MONEY 
MARKET 
COAL 
JEC 
IOWA 
SOUTH 
WEST 
SHORT 
FINANCE 
OUTPUT 
PRICES 
LAND 
ROI 
TABLE 2 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
Description and Source 
Monthly commercial paper rate in New York City for 
choice 60-90 day two name paper (Macaulay, 1938). 
Monthly return premium on industrial common stock 
index (railroads excluded) (Cowles, 1939). 
Monthly return premium on index of common coal stocks 
(Cowles, 1939). 
Equally-weighted monthly return premium on stocks 
contained in JEC portfolio (Commercial and Financial 
Chronicles, 1884-88). 
Equally-weighted monthly return premium on stocks 
· contained in IOWA portfolio (Commercial and Financial 
Chronicles, 1884-88). 
Equally-weighted monthly return premium on stocks 
contained in SOUTH portfolio (Commercial and Financial 
Chronicles, 1884-88). 
Equally-weighted monthly return premium on stocks 
contained in WEST portfolio (Commercial and 
Financial Chronicles, 1884-88). 
Equally-weighted monthly return premium on stocks 
contained in SHORT portfolio (Commercial and 
Financial Chronicles, 1884-88). 
Percentage change in total monthly bank clearings outside of 
New York, in thousands of dollars (Macaulay, 1938). 
Percentage change in a monthly index of pig iron 
production, (Macaulay, 1938). 
Percentage change in a monthly index of the general 
price level (Macaulay, 1938). 
The per capita value of farm land in an ICC 
territorial grouping, in millions of dollars (Fogel, 
1964). 
The rate of return on railroad capital in an ICC 
territorial grouping (Statistical Abstract of the 
States, 1890). 
TABLE 3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Variables Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
MONEY .00401 .00065 .00287 .00560 
MARKET .00640 .02 1 1 6  -.08 162 . 05530 
COAL .01 1 97 .08960 -. 18551 .30529 
JEC -.00347 .05980 -. 13777 . 14401 
IOWA -.00648 .04597 - . 15056 .09644 
SOUTH .00156 .06482 - . 17294 . 16965 
WEST -.00936 .05316 -. 1 68 1 1 . 14453 
SHORT .00048 .06552 -. 17359 . 18032 
FINANCE .00462 .07889 -. 14310  .21936 
OUTPUT .01 1 27 .05922 -. 18876 . 17303 
PRICES -.00041 .00462 -.0 1274 .01274 
LAND . 1 1828 .07171  .03993 .20686 
ROI 9.05667 2.42268 5.35700 1 1 .43700 
TABLE 4 
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION ESTIMATES:  
PORTFOLIO RETURNS 
Portfolios Likelihood 
Ratio Test 
Variables COAL JEC IOWA SOUTH WEST SHORT 
of
bHl 
Constant -0.006 -0.019 -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 -0.0 15 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
MARKET 2.637 1 .660 1 .338 1 .782 1 .668 2.087 129.69 
(0.409) (0.269) (0.227) (0.269) (0.21 9) (0.250) 
FINANCE -0.084 0.066 -0. 100 -0.06 1 0.033 0.030 5.15 
(0. 1 1 8) (0.078) (0.066) (0.077) (0.063) (0.072) 
OUTPUT -0.057 0. 1 63 0.056 0.055 -0.067 0. 155 14. 1 8
(0. 146) (0.096) (0.08 1) (0.096) (0.078) (0.090) 
PRICES 2.034 1 .583 0.056 2.504 2.729 2.883 1 1 .7 1 
(2.020) ( 1 .328) ( 1 . 122) ( 1 .329) ( 1 .082) ( 1 .237) 
WABASH 0.09 1 0.033 0.002 0. 100 0.012 0.015  19.54 
(0.047) (0.03 1) (0.026) (0.031) (0.025) (0.029) 
SHPC 0.067 0.077 0.02 1 0.001 0.034 0.026 9.35 
(0.048) (0.03 1) (0.026) (0.03 1) (0.026) (0.029) 
Likelihood 
Ratioc 5.04 1 5.943 0.34 1 5. 108 0.985 0.073 
Test of H2 
SSE 0.068 0.045 0.038 0.049 0.037 0.042 
� Standard errors in parentheses below estimates.
The likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed x2( 6) under the null hypothesis that all of the
parameters for the }th systematic or indicator variable equals zero. The critical value for 
X2(6, .05) is 10.64.c The likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed x2(1) under the null hypothesis that the sum of the 
parameters on the indicator variables equals zero. The critical value for x2( 1 ,  .05) is 2.7 1 .
TABLE S 
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSION ESTIMATES :  
RETURN RESPONSE P ARAMETERSa 
Variable Parameter 
WABASH -0.046 
(0.042) 
SHPC -0.029 
(0.042) 
ROI 0.0 1 8  
(0.008) 
LAND -0.583 
(0.258) 
NET -0.023 
(0.019) 
Likelihood Ratio 30.02 
Test of H3b
a Standard errors in parentheses below estimates. 
b The likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed as 
a x2(3) under the null hypothesis that the sum
of the parameters on ROI, LAND and NET 
equal zero. The critical value for x2(3, .05)
is 7.8 1 .  
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